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Abstract Yield spreads on commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) are deﬁned as the difference between the yield on
CMBS and the yield on comparable-maturity Treasuries. CMBS
yield spreads declined dramatically from 1992 until 1997, then
increased in 1998 and 1999. The relationship between CMBS
yield spreads and other variables is estimated in an effort to
explain recent trends. Results identify several variables that are
related to yield spreads on both ﬁxed-rate and variable-rate
CMBS. However, even after controlling for other observable
factors, the yield spread on CMBS still declined from 1992 until
1997, then increased each of the next two years. Possible
explanations for this phenomenon are explored.
Introduction
The market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) has grown rapidly in recent
years. Initially, Veterans Administration (VA) and Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) single-family mortgages guaranteed or insured against default by the U.S.
Government supported most mortgage-backed securities. Only after secondary
markets for MBS on FHA and VA loans were well established did the secondary
market for MBS supported by conventional residential mortgages develop. In
1970, less than 10% of single-family mortgages had been securitized; by 1992,
of the $3.1 trillion of residential mortgages outstanding, nearly half were
securitized (Fabozzi and Jacob, 1997). The growth rate of securitization of
commercial mortgages during the 1990s is roughly comparable to the pattern of
securitization of residential mortgages in the 1980s. As of the end of 1990, 9.5%
of multifamily mortgages had been securitized, almost entirely by GNMA, FNMA
and FHLMC, and less than 1% of other commercial mortgages had been
securitized, all by the private sector. By the end of 1999, 58.8% of multifamily
mortgages were securitized. (Calculations based on ﬁgures in Mortgage Market
Statistical Annual for 2000.) The slower pace of commercial mortgage
securitization relative to residential mortgages may be related to the fact that very
few commercial mortgages (including multifamily) are insured or guaranteed by
the federal government.236  Maris and Segal
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As the volume of CMBS increases, an issue of interest to investors is how the
yields on such securities compare with yields on alternative investments. In the
mid-1990s, the trade press noted a decline in CMBS yield spreads (deﬁned as the
difference between yields on CMBS and yields on U.S. Treasury securities of
comparable maturity) (see, for example, Fathe-Aazam, 1995; Fabozzi and Jacob,
1997; and Zuckerman, 1998). As shown in Exhibit 1, CMBS AAA yield spreads
in 1997 were less than one-half the level of 1992. Beginning in 1998, however,
CMBS yield spreads began increasing, and in 1999 AAA yield spreads approached
1993 levels. Similar trends are evident for lower-rated investment-grade CMBS,
as shown in Exhibit 2.
Yield spreads on a particular class of securities are expected to respond to a variety
of factors, including differences in default risk, call risk, taxability, liquidity and
possibly other factors. The purpose of this study is to estimate the relationship
between CMBS yield spreads and other variables in an attempt to determine the
extent to which recent trends in CMBS yield spreads can be explained by changes
in other observable variables.
 Development of the CMBS Market
There are several reasons securitization developed later for commercial mortgages
than for residential mortgages. Until recent years, commercial mortgage lending
was a local market, dominated by banks, thrifts and insurance companies.
Moreover, as was true on the residential side prior to the creation of the FHA,Analysis of Yield Spreads on Securities  237
JRER  Vol. 23  No. 3 – 2002






1992 AAA 8 165.4
AA 16 204.1
A 3 301.7
BBB 3 320.0 206.1
1993 AAA 25 126.4
AA 28 162.3
A 13 217.3
BBB 14 263.6 177.7
1994 AAA 33 95.7
AA 43 114.1
A 36 147.2
BBB 34 226.8 144.3
1995 AAA 62 92.8
AA 46 114.5
A 34 143.6
BBB 45 207.8 135.0
1996 AAA 85 79.0
AA 48 99.8
A 42 120.7
BBB 66 167.6 114.7
1997 AAA 105 62.6
AA 53 76.8
A 50 92.1
BBB 89 122.4 88.0
1998 AAA 99 97.7
AA 48 124.3
A 50 143.4
BBB 83 212.3 144.4
1999 AAA 119 125.3
AA 54 153.1
A 81 184.2
BBB 85 281.2 182.9
Source: CMBS Database, 2000.238  Maris and Segal
commercial mortgages lacked consistent underwriting standards, documentation
or agency backing, and as a result, did not easily support securitization. GNMA,
FNMA and FHLMC have issued multifamily MBS for a number of years, with
an annual average volume of $4.9 billion of multifamily MBS during 1985–1991
(Fabozzi, Ramsey, Ramirez and Marz, 1997). Implicit or explicit guarantees on
these securities, however, might have accustomed multifamily MBS investors to
a degree of protection from default risk, and therefore did not catalyze any
signiﬁcant degree of ‘‘nonagency’’ commercial mortgage securitization. Aside
from these transactions, however, which typically require lenders to conform to
‘‘agency’’ underwriting requirements,1 a tremendous variety of loan characteristics
exists among the commercial mortgages. On the investor side, traditional ﬁxed
income investors lacked the historical data and experience to evaluate default risk
and other features of commercial mortgages.
Several changes occurred in the early 1990s that affected commercial mortgage
lending. The difﬁculties of thrifts, beginning in the 1980s, rapidly deteriorated
into a widely publicized crisis. The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) liquidated
billions of dollars in commercial mortgages. Between 1991 and 1995, the RTC
securitized nearly $18 billion in performing and non-performing commercial
mortgages, with nearly $14 billion of that total occurring in the two years
following its ﬁrst such deal in August 1991 (Fabozzi and Jacob,1997). Nonagency
CMBS issuance increased from approximately $5 billion annually in 1989–1990
to approximately $15 billion in 1992, with most of the increase in the form of
RTC issues. The RTC gave birth to underwriting standards, rating criteria and
evaluation techniques that made it easier for nonagency deals to follow.
Another component of the government’s response to the thrift crisis, FIRREA,
imposed increased capital requirements on direct commercial mortgage lending
by thrifts, commercial banks and insurance companies. Even credit-worthy
borrowers had difﬁculty obtaining credit, and sought alternative sources. Interest
rates were relatively low in the 1990s, and investors sought new investment
vehicles. In conjunction with widespread market acceptance of RTC securities,
these factors meant that, in 1993, when RTC issues dropped dramatically, the
increase in private issues more than offset the drop in RTC activity, and total
nonagency issues were up for the year. The volume of nonagency CMBS activity
dropped slightly in 1995 to less than $20 billion, but recovered in 1996 to reach
a level of $30 billion, followed by $44 billion in 1997; $78 billion in 1998 and
$67 billion in 1999 (Fabozzi, Ramsey, Ramirez and Marz, 1997; and CMBS
Database, 2000).
 Literature
Riddiough and Polleys (1999) analyze the determinants of CMBS subordination
levels and of CMBS yield spreads using time series analysis of 119 AAA-rated
CMBS tranches issued during 1994–1996. A principal ﬁnding of their analysis isAnalysis of Yield Spreads on Securities  239
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that even within AAA-rated tranches, variables measuring credit risk (such as
measures of geographic and property-type concentration) and the presence of
cross-default clauses affect pricing via a default premium. Yield spreads are
compressed in public transactions and conduit deals, which are typically
comprised of newly-originated mortgages originated to CMBS investor standards,
and by lockout and yield-maintenance provisions, which restrict mortgage
prepayments, thereby mitigating reinvestment risk. They attribute a signiﬁcant and
negative time coefﬁcient to a multilateral learning process involving issuers, rating
agencies and investors. They conclude that CMBS market development ‘‘might
be better characterized as rational and orderly, as opposed to one subject to mob
psychology and pricing bubbles,’’ at least through 1996 (Riddiough and Polleys,
1999: 20).
Nothaft and Freund (1999) analyze the spreads between commercial mortgage
interest rates and comparable-maturity Treasury yields. The emphasis of their
research is commercial and multifamily mortgage spreads, rather than CMBS
spreads per se. Using a variety of data sources covering the period from the late
1970s and early 1980s through the second quarter of 1998 to estimate time-series
models, they ﬁnd that commercial mortgage spreads are positively associated with
the difference in composite between corporate bonds rated AAA and those rated
A by Moody’s; and inversely related to commercial property appreciation rates.
 Research Methodology and Data Description
This study examines spreads between yields on CMBS securities and appropriate
option-free securities of similar maturity. The difference in yields is attributed (at
least in part) to the value of the prepayment and default options embedded in the
underlying mortgages. The data include all publicly traded nonagency CMBS from
the beginning of 1992 through 1999.2 The sample includes 1,600 ﬁxed-rate CMBS
tranches and 479 variable-rate CMBS tranches. The analysis augments previous
work by Riddiough and Polleys (1999) by utilizing a considerably larger number
of observations, as well as extending the sample period beyond the early years of
the CMBS market in 1992–1996 to include 1997–1999. The approach taken here
differs from their time-series analysis in that this study is based on when-issued
data on each security as described below. Other differences in model speciﬁcations
reﬂect differences in data sources.3
The method of analysis used here is similar in some respects to that of Rothberg,
Nothaft and Gabriel (1989), who identiﬁed various factors inﬂuencing the spread
between yields on single-family mortgage-backed securities and U.S. Treasury
securities. Among the factors they considered are credit (default) risk, prepayment
risk, marketability (liquidity) and tax considerations. They estimated the
relationship between yield spread and the other variables using linear regression.
The method they employ is appropriate for analyzing commercial mortgage-
backed securities, but the differences between single-family and commercial240  Maris and Segal
mortgages are sufﬁcient that their empirical results cannot be generalized to the
commercial market. In particular, prepayment and reﬁnancing patterns are
different. A single-family mortgage can be prepaid at any time without restrictions.
Recently issued ﬁxed-rate commercial mortgages typically cannot be reﬁnanced
without incurring a penalty.4 As a result, many researchers investigating
commercial mortgages have focused on default risk and ignored prepayment risk
with the justiﬁcation that prepayment penalties are effective in preventing early
repayment or fully compensate the lender in the event of early prepayment. Fu,
LaCour-Little and Vandell (2000) present empirical evidence showing that
prepayment of commercial mortgages does occur and cannot be ignored.
Data for each security is as of the issue date. The analysis cannot be characterized
as cross-sectional, because the date of issue is different for nearly every issue.
However, because we have data for only the issue date, it is not a time-series
analysis. Linear regression is used to estimate the following, separately for ﬁxed-
rate and adjustable rate transactions:
SP  a  b(ISSAMT)  c(TRAMT) i
 d(CORP SPRD)  e (DC P D I F F ) 1 AA
 e (DC P D I F F )  e (DC P D I F F ) 2 A 3 BBB
 ƒ( D )  ... ƒ( D ) 19 3 79 9
 g(SD)  h(TS)  j(XRI)  . (1) i
Where:
SPi  Yield spread on CMBS tranche i;
ISSAMT  Natural log of total CMBS issue amount (in millions of $);
TRAMT  Natural log of tranche amount (in millions of $);
CORP SPRD  rAAA  r10TR;
rAAA  Yield on AAA-rated corporate bonds;
r10TR  Yield on 10-year Treasury bonds;
Dj  Dummy variable for highest rating on tranche i (RATING);
Dh  Dummy variable for year of issue (YEAR);
CPDIFF  rBBB  rAAA;
rBBB  Yield on corporate bonds rated BBB;
SD  Standard deviation of the 10-year T-bond yield over the previous
ﬁfty-two weeks;
TS  10-year Treasury yield  3-month Treasury yield;
XRI  Experimental Recession Index; and
i  error term.Analysis of Yield Spreads on Securities  241
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Variable Description
SP. Because yield spreads (SP) differ across tranches, the tranche is the unit of
observation for the dependent variable. Tranches rated below BBB (investment
grade) are excluded. Because the discussion in the business and trade press has
focused on the absolute spread (ri  where ri is the yield on tranche i r , COMP TR
and is the yield on the comparable-maturity Treasury security) the rCOMP TR
relationship is estimated using the absolute spread as the dependent variable.5
However, as pointed out by Rothberg, Nothaft and Gabriel (1989) due to tax
effects, it might be preferable to analyze the relative spread (ri/ Taxes r ). COMP TR
affect yield spreads because the interest on Treasury securities is exempt from
state and local income taxes, while interest on nonagency MBS is not. As a result,
MBS yield spreads are positively related to the level of interest rates due to tax
effects. As the overall level of interest rates drops, the MBS yield spread is also
expected to drop somewhat. Therefore, Equation (1) is also estimated using
relative spreads.6
ISSAMT. As the CMBS market has grown, and the size of individual issues has
increased, one might expect yield spreads to narrow due to greater liquidity.
According to Levy (1997) the trend is toward bigger CMBS deals with two or
more investment banking ﬁrms participating. Investors are attracted because they
expect the improved liquidity associated with a deeper market.7 If liquidity is
positively impacted by larger deals, the liquidity premium is expected to decline
with transaction size. In 1992, the average size for CMBS deals included in the
sample was $598 million. In 1999, the average size of CMBS deals included in
the sample increased to $799 million. Alternatively, however, some transactions
might be too large for the market to absorb them without a widening of the yield
spread. The size of the transaction, ISSAMT, is therefore included to control for
size effects and to measure which of these competing effects is empirically greater.
TRAMT. Individual securities, not the entire MBS deal, are traded in the secondary
market. For this reason, tranche size, TRAMT, may have even greater effects on
liquidity and pricing than does the total deal size.8 Therefore, TRAMT is also
included in the model. To the extent that either tranche size or total deal size is
positively related to liquidity, the expectation is that yield spreads will be inversely
related to size.
SD, TS, CORP SPRD, CPDIFF, XRI. Several variables are included in the
Rothberg, Nothaft and Gabriel (1989) model to capture the probability of
prepayment. Prepayment risk on MBS arises from two sources: prepayments and
default. The value of a mortgage incorporates the borrower’s option to prepay (a
call option on the mortgage) and the borrower’s option to default (a put option
on the collateral property). For single-family residential mortgages, prepayment is
more common than default, and the call option dominates. An increase in interest
rate volatility SD increases the value of the borrower’s option to reﬁnance, and
therefore interest rate volatility is positively related to yield spreads on single-242  Maris and Segal
family mortgages and the associated MBS. Similarly, according to the expectations
theory of the term structure, the slope of the yield curve TS is an indicator of the
expected future course of interest rates. If interest rates are expected to be lower
in the future, it increases the likelihood that prepayment will be ﬁnancially
beneﬁcial, and should result in larger spreads on single-family mortgages (see
Rothberg, Nothaft and Gabriel, 1989: 303 for further discussion). The results of
Rothberg et al. for single-family MBS are consistent with those expectations.
For commercial mortgages, as well as for CMBS, however, the effect of interest-
rate volatility might be somewhat different. As mentioned, recently issued ﬁxed-
rate commercial mortgages typically contain prepayment penalties.9 As a result,
it is likely the put option to default on a commercial mortgage dominates the call
option to prepay. For CMBS, the losses associated with default are borne by the
lower-rated tranches. The effect of default on the senior tranches is to accelerate
the repayment of principal. The resulting early return of principal may be
advantageous to the investor because of the time value of money, but will be
disadvantageous to the extent it results in reinvestment risk. The net effect of
default risk on yield spreads is therefore an empirical question. In addition, the
results of Fu, LaCour-Little and Vandell (2000) indicate that even for commercial
mortgages, prepayments due to reﬁnancing are of sufﬁcient magnitude that they
cannot be ignored. Hence interest-rate volatility may also contribute to higher yield
spreads because of its effects on prepayments, to the extent that reinvestment risk
dominates the time-value-of-money effects of the early return of principal.
Titman and Torous (1989) show a positive correlation between changes in
commercial property values and the variability of interest rates. Consequently,
increased interest rate variability (SD in this analysis) is associated in turn with
the greater variability of property values, and increased likelihood of default in
circumstances where unpaid principal balance exceeds property value. Titman and
Torous also indicate that the default risk on commercial mortgages is related to
the slope of the yield curve (TS).
The NBER’s Experimental Recession Index (XRI), which is an estimate of the
probability of a recession in six months, is also included in the analysis as an
additional measure of default risk.10 The XRI is computed using four monthly
series from the NBER’s Experimental Coincident Index and all seven monthly
series included in the NBER’s Experimental Leading Index.11 During the 1992–
1999 sample period, values for XRI are greater than 5% only ﬁfteen months. The
index exceeded 5% for the ﬁrst time in November 1994, and was above that
threshold in ﬁve of the following six months. It exceeded 5% again in May 1997,
in ﬁve months from June through December 1998, and in four months during
1999. The index exceeded 10% only twice during the sample period.
In addition, two more variables are included in the model that is intended to reﬂect
default risk. The spread between AAA-rated corporate bond yields and 10-year
Treasury yields (CORP SPRD) is included as a proxy for the overall credit
market’s default risk premium. Additionally, the difference between yields on low-Analysis of Yield Spreads on Securities  243
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Constant 0.021 0.52 0.002 18.80
0.58 0.02 0.026 0.61
ISSAMT 0.007* 4.98* 0.005 3.84
2.73 3.58 0.81 1.48
TRAMT 0.002 2.40* 0.009 4.23
0.86 2.04 1.58 1.81
rAAA  r10TR 0.253* 101.21* 0.197* 56.65*
23.92 16.44 7.82 5.33
DAACPDIFF 0.062* 30.45* 0.083* 34.81*
8.91 7.49 5.10 5.03
DACPDIFF 0.123* 66.92* 0.213* 95.08*
16.10 15.07 11.29 11.92
DBBBCPDIFF 0.29* 160.79* 0.429* 192.53*
37.73 35.90 21.28 22.62
D93 0.076* 57.09* 0.052 34.96*
5.16 6.65 1.82 2.89
and high-rated corporate bonds (CPDIFF) is included, based on the results of
Duca and Rosenthal (1991). CPDIFF is entered in the regression through
interactive terms created by multiplying CPDIFF times the dummy variables
representing security ratings (the rationale for the interactive terms is provided
below). Because CORP SPRD and CPDIFF are calculated as default premiums,
these are expected to be positively correlated with CMBS yield spreads.
D. Dummy variables (YEAR) are included for each year other than 1992. Another
set of dummy variables (RATING) are included for security ratings (other than
AAA) because lower rated securities have higher yields to compensate investors
for the greater default risk. The base case is therefore an AAA-rated CMBS issued
in 1992. As noted, interactive terms were created by multiplying the rating
dummies by CPDIFF. This has the effect of making estimated spreads between
AAA-, AA-, A- and BBB-rated CMBS tranches proportional to changes in the
corporate bond yield spread.
 Empirical Results
The results of estimating regression Equation (1) for both the absolute spread and
the relative spread are shown in Exhibit 3. Results for ﬁxed-rate CMBS, shown
on the left-hand side of Exhibit 3, are discussed next.244  Maris and Segal








D94 0.096* 71.12* 0.142* 50.14*
6.54 8.35 5.35 4.48
D95 0.151* 75.87* 0.178* 49.07*
7.48 6.46 3.95 2.57
D96 0.147* 82.04* 0.195* 57.09*
8.03 7.69 4.97 3.45
D97 0.178* 98.74* 0.216* 62.02*
8.73 8.31 4.77 3.24
D98 0.159* 89.35* 0.226** 69.41*
7.13 6.88 4.14 3.01
D99 0.161* 82.76* 0.170* 38.30
8.30 7.31 3.61 1.92
SD 0.028 38.64* 0.027 52.97*
1.35 3.23 0.57 2.64
TS 0.014* 9.49* 0.034* 12.65
2.44 2.78 2.13 1.89
XRI 0.492* 413.77* 0.058 77.42
5.70 8.23 0.267 0.84
Adj. R2 0.765 0.724 0.718 0.716
F 326.30 262.96 77.18 76.44
Notes: Below each coefﬁcient is the associated t-Statistic. N  1600 for ﬁxed rate; N  479 for
variable rate.
*Signiﬁcant at the .05 level.
Variable deﬁnitions:
AbsSP  Absolute spread
 CMBS yield  Yield on Treasury of comparable maturity (in basis points)
Rel SP  Relative spread
 AbsSP/Yield on 10-year Treasury (fixed-rate CMBS)
 AbsSP/Yield on 3-month T-bill (variable-rate CMBS)
ISSAMT  Natural log of issue amount in millions of $
TRAMT  natural log of tranche amount in millions of $
r  yield on AAA-rated corporate bonds AAA
r  yield on 10-year Treasury bonds 10TR
D  Dummy variable for highest rating on tranche i or for year of issue j
CPDIFF  r  r BBB AAA
r  yield on corporate bonds rated BBB BBB
SD  standard deviation of the 10-year T-bond yield over previous fifty-two weeks
TS  10-year Treasury yield  3 month Treasury yield
XRI  Experimental Recession IndexAnalysis of Yield Spreads on Securities  245
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Because the results for relative spread and absolute spread are so similar, they are
discussed together. The coefﬁcients for tranche size (TRAMT) are negative,
although it is signiﬁcant only for absolute spread. This provides some support for
the notion that larger tranches are associated with lower liquidity premia, as
expected. On the other hand, the coefﬁcients for total deal size (ISSAMT) are
positive and signiﬁcant for both the absolute spread and the relative spread,
indicating that larger deals are associated with higher spreads. Evidently, the main
effect of deal size is that larger transactions require larger spreads to attract a
sufﬁcient number of investors to place the issue.
The coefﬁcients for the difference between AAA-rated corporate bond yields and
Treasury bond yields (CORP SPRD) are positive, as expected, and statistically
signiﬁcant. A 1% increase in CORP SPRD corresponds to a 101 basis point
increase in spread between AAA-rated CMBS and Treasuries.
The interactive dummy variables formed by multiplying security rating dummies
times CPDIFF are each signiﬁcant, and indicate that spreads are inversely related
to rating, as expected. The coefﬁcients represent average differences between yield
spreads during the sample period: AA-rated securities averaged yields 30.4 basis
points higher than AAA after controlling for other variables, given an average
value for CPDIFF; A-rated issues averaged 66.9 basis points higher than AAA,
and BBB-rated issues averaged 160.8 basis points higher than AAA.
As discussed in the previous section, higher interest rate volatility (SD) and the
Experimental Recession Index (XRI) are both positively associated with greater
likelihood of default on the underlying mortgages. As shown in Exhibit 3, the
coefﬁcients for both SD and XRI are positive. In the case of the absolute spread,
both coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant, while for relative spread, only the coefﬁcient for
XRI is signiﬁcant. Evidently, reinvestment risk dominates the time value of money,
resulting in a default risk premium for investment grade CMBS as measured by
coefﬁcients on these two variables.12
The term structure variable (TS) is positive and signiﬁcant for the absolute spread,
and negative and signiﬁcant for the relative spread. Because interest on nonagency
CMBS is fully taxable, the relative spread is arguably the more reliable of these
two measures in the present context. To the extent that a ﬂat or inverted yield
curve is associated with the possibility of recession, the negative coefﬁcient on
TS in the relative spread speciﬁcation is consistent with the preceding result
regarding XRI: the larger is TS, the less likely is recession and therefore default,
providing investors with an additional measure of protection from reinvestment
risk.
The results for variable-rate CMBS (shown on the right-hand side of Exhibit 3)
are in some regards similar to those for ﬁxed-rate CMBS. Although their signs
are the same as for ﬁxed-rate CMBS, neither of the size variables have coefﬁcients
that are signiﬁcantly different from zero in either the absolute spread or the relative
spread cases. The coefﬁcient for interest rate volatility (SD) is positive and246  Maris and Segal
signiﬁcant for the absolute spread, and positive but not signiﬁcant for the relative
spread (as was also the case for ﬁxed-rate).
The coefﬁcient for the term structure (TS) is positive in both adjustable-rate
speciﬁcations, and signiﬁcant for the relative spread case, the opposite of the result
in the ﬁxed-rate case. In part, this difference may relate to the fact that
reinvestment risk, which evidently commands an investor premium in the ﬁxed-
rate case, is of course absent for holders of variable-rate instruments. To the extent
that a steeper yield curve indicates that recession is unlikely, the possibility of
default and the attendant early return of principal, which would be advantageous
to the investor from the standpoint of the time value of money, is reduced. The
coefﬁcient for the Experimental Recession Index (XRI) is not signiﬁcantly
different from zero for either the absolute or the relative spread regressions,
possibly because the effects of recessionary prospects on variable-rate CMBS
spreads are captured through TS.
Each of the dummy variables for year is signiﬁcant, indicating that CMBS spreads
are decreasing from year-to-year, beginning in 1992, until 1997. They then
increase each of the next two years. This is consistent with the average spreads
shown in Exhibit 2, but more importantly, indicates that, even after controlling for
changes in the other variables, the trend in CMBS spreads changed course in
1998.
Yield spreads on CMBS declined dramatically from 1992 to mid-1998. The results
indicate that yield spreads on ﬁxed-rate CMBS are positively related to total deal
size, to the spread between AAA-rated corporate bonds and T-bonds, and to the
XRI, and inversely related to the security rating. Variable-rate CMBS yield spreads
are positively related to the spread between AAA-rated corporate bonds and T-
bonds, and inversely related to rating. However, the results indicate that, even after
controlling for other factors, CMBS yield spreads declined during 1992–1997,
followed by increases during 1998 and 1999.
The compression of CMBS yield spreads during 1992–1997 may have resulted
from a number of factors. Certainly there is evidence to support the notion of
multilateral learning involving issuers, rating agencies and investors as
hypothesized by Riddiough and Polleys (1999). In the early 1990s, when
nonagency CMBS issues were ﬁrst issued in substantial amounts, the U.S. was
recovering from a recession that hit commercial property values very hard. Many
loans held by the FDIC and RTC were of low or questionable quality and proper
documentation was often lacking. Investors (and rating agencies) were unfamiliar
with analyzing commercial mortgages and the risks they posed. Lack of familiarity
might have caused investors to overestimate the risks, and could explain why yield
spreads were high in the early 1990s.
As investors gained familiarity, they developed greater conﬁdence in their ability
to assess the risks, and required lower risk premiums. An indication of this is the
change in the percentage of tranches with ‘‘split’’ ratings: ratings from differentAnalysis of Yield Spreads on Securities  247
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Exhibit 4  Percentage of Split Ratings by Year









Note: A split rating occurs if different raters provide different ratings to the same security.
raters that are a full rating category apart (AAA by Standard and Poor’s, Aa by
Moody’s, for example). Exhibit 4 shows the percentage of split ratings by year.
For the ﬁrst two years (1992–1993), more than 21% of the tranches received split
ratings. For 1994–1999, the percentage was less than one-fourth as high, at 4.7%.
The hypothesis that the two percentages are the same must be rejected (the z-
Statistic  6.8). This indicates a higher degree of uncertainty on the part of
security raters about the default risk of individual CMBS in the early 1990’s.13
 Conclusion
Now that the 1992–1997 trend toward compression of yield spreads has reversed
course, it appears that some additional factors may also have been at work. A
number of studies have concluded that lenders eased their underwriting standards
during the mid-1990s. The 1998 Survey of Credit Underwriting Practices
published by the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency states that underwriting
standards for commercial loans have eased each year during 1994–1997. The
primary reason cited by examiners for easing underwriting standards was
competitive pressure. According to the FDIC’s 1998 Report on Underwriting
Practices the weakening of underwriting practices was especially noteworthy in
commercial real estate lending. A general lowering of underwriting standards by
lenders will increase the overall probability of default on commercial mortgages.
If lender underwriting standards fell due to competitive pressure, it is plausible
that similar pressures could have affected rating agencies. Rating agencies often
recruit staff from issuers, and vice versa, and may therefore be subject to similar
inﬂuences.14 The turning point in CMBS yield spreads coincided with the ﬁnancial
markets turmoil in the fall of 1998. Investors began to express reluctance to
purchase the subordinate tranches in CMBS transactions, jeopardizing the ability248  Maris and Segal
of issuers to credit enhance the senior tranches as well.15 Judging by articles in
the trade press, the CMBS market during that time might have reﬂected a degree
of internal ‘‘ﬁnancial contagion’’ in which investors were inﬂuenced by actions of
other investors in a manner with lasting consequences for CMBS yield spreads
and issuance volume.
The notion that the events of Fall 1998 represent a turning point in ﬁnancial
markets has gained widespread acceptance. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan commented as follows in a recent speech:
During the past couple of years...t h ewidespread optimism that was
apparent in ﬁnancial markets has given way to some reassessment of
risks and opportunities. This process has been underway ever since the
global ﬁnancial crisis in the Fall of 1998. That episode forced many
market participants to recognize the potential for international risks to
feed back on U.S. markets. Events brought into sharper focus the
possibility that liquidity in many markets can dry up simultaneously
when fear spurs risk aversion, and an intense, near-term focus on
protecting capital values markedly elevates the demand for liquidity.
Markets largely recovered from that episode, but an imprint was left in
the form of wider credit spreads and more cautious behavior on the
part of banks and other lenders.16
Chairman Greenspan’s remarks are consistent with the notion that, at least for a
time in the Fall of 1998, an element of herd behavior, in which few could
withstand the fear of being left behind, took the place of the atomistic decision-
making sometimes ascribed to investors. If so, this begs the question of whether
interaction effects between investors (‘‘irrational exuberance’’) also contributed to
the compression of yield spreads in prior years. It is hoped that further research
will shed light on these questions.
 Endnotes
1 The Government Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs, do purchase loans that do not comply
with their standard underwriting guidelines in ‘‘negotiated transactions.’’
2 Most of the data were obtained from the CMBS Database, 2000. The conclusion that
this data source includes the entire publicly-traded CMBS market is supported by a
comparison of total issuance volume with other industry sources The CMBS Database
is available to subscribers to Commercial Mortgage Alert, published by Harrison-Scott
Publications, http://www.cmalert.com/cma/index.htm. Other data were obtained from
the Federal Reserve website, the NBER website and the U.S. Department of Commerce
website.
3 This article departs signiﬁcantly from the approach of Nothaft and Freund (1998), who
seek to explain variation in mortgage spreads, which is a different issue than spreads
on investment-grade CMBS, which are protected from default risk in a manner quite
different from the underlying mortgage collateral.Analysis of Yield Spreads on Securities  249
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4 The effects of a number of different types of commercial mortgage prepayment penalties
are discussed in Fu, LaCour-Little and Vandell (2000). They present empirical results
indicating that prepayment of commercial mortgages occurs with sufﬁcient frequency
that it cannot be ignored. See also Manus J. Clancy and Michael Constantino, The
Effects of Prepayment Restrictions on the Bond Structures of CMBS in Fabozzi and
Jacob (1997).
5 In some cases, the benchmark is identiﬁed in the data as the ‘‘Treasury yield curve.’’
For some variable-rate issues, LIBOR is used.
6 The relative spread for ﬁxed-rate CMBS is deﬁned as the absolute spread divided by
the yield on a 10-year Treasury. For variable-rate CMBS, the 3-month Treasury bill is
used in the denominator.
7 On the closely related issue of the connection between transaction size and execution
costs, see Leinweber (1993).
8 During 1992–1999, when deal size was increasing signiﬁcantly, the average number of
tranches per issue also increased, so the average tranche size increased only slightly,
from $110 million to $112 million.
9 Earlier commercial mortgages often lacked such penalties. RTC deals were backed by
such mortgages, which might have contributed to higher spreads for those issues.
10 Speciﬁcations were estimated including other default risk proxies, such as the rental
vacancy rate, the quarterly change in GDP, and the quarterly change in the NBER’s
Index of Coincidental Indicators, but did not perform as well as the selected
speciﬁcation.
11 For more details, see Stock and Watson (1989).
12 The effects of interest-rate volatility on prepayments are also likely to contribute to
wider yield spreads, but this effect is likely to be smaller than that of defaults due to
the presence of yield spread maintenance agreements, as discussed.
13 However, the fact that rating agencies tend to have greater agreement now about the
appropriate rating for CMBS does not mean that the current consensus rating accurately
reﬂects default risk or that existing yield spreads adequately compensate investors for
that risk. Nor does it explain why the percentage of split ratings increased in 1999 or
yield spreads have recovered in the last two years of the 1990s.
14 Commercial Mortgage Alert, various issues.
15 See New CMBS Headache: B-Piece Market Softens, Commercial Mortgage Alert,
September 21, 1998; Criimi Bankruptcy Accelerates CMBS Freefall, Commercial
Mortgage Alert, October 12, 1998.
16 Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, Structural Changes in the Economy and
Financial Markets, America’s Community Bankers Conference, New York, NY,
December 5, 2000.
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